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1. Statement of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the 
Third District Court in an action commenced December 
21, 1946 (R. 5) by stockholders of Granite Holding Com-
pany, the corporate defendant, to set aside a sale of the 
sole remaining assets of that corporation to the indivi-
dual defendant, W. L. Hansen. The action was second-
ary for the benefit of the corporation and it was a class 
suit as it was initiated by plaintiffs for themselves and 
all others. s~ilarly situated. 
During the course of the proceedings plaintiff Lewis 
F. Hansen withdrew as a plaintiff to which the defend-
ants stipulated, (R. 75) and plaintiffs J. R. Jensen and 
W m. V. Jensen, during the progress of the trial hear-
ings, moved for a dismissal as to them which was 
granted (R. 102). The fact is that these latter two were 
never shown to be stockholders and of course they had 
no right in the action. The plaintiffs remaining are 
Ralph Cutler, Hettie May Bates and WilliamS. Young, 
all stockholders of the corporation prior to bringing 
the action and at the time the case was tried (R. 149-
274-292). The court so found (R. 104). They produced 
their stock certificates in court and defendants had 
ample opportunity to examine them. 
2. The Facts. 
We are not at all satisfied with the statement of 
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facts presented by the appellant. We feel that it \viii 
be extren1ely helpful to the court to nmke a cmnplete 
statement of the facts with respect to the matter. 
The defendant corporation was organized under the 
name of the Granite Lumber Company in 1901. By an 
amendinent on ,June 18, 1927 the name was changed to 
Granite Holding Company. At one time the company 
owned considerable property in the Sugarhouse area in 
Salt Lake City. Prior to 1945 it had disposed of all its 
property except that involved in this law suit. For years 
no meetings of stockholders had been held nor had there 
been any meetings of the Board of Directors, except 
such as were held to satisfy mortgages. Nephi J. Hansen 
managed the Granite Holding Company (R. 209). The 
corporation was authorized to and had issued two kind~ 
of stock, common and preferred, and under the Articles 
which are an exhibit in the case, holders of preferred 
stock had voting rights upon failure to pay preferred 
dividends when three years past due. The three stock-
holder witnesses, Hettie May Bates (R. 148), Ralph 
Cutler (R. 291) and William s~ Young (R. 274) all tes-
tified that they had been associated with the company 
for many years, had never heard anything about its 
affairs, never been called to any stockholders meetings, 
but once in a while one of them would meet Nephi J. 
Hansen on the streets in Sugarhouse and Mr. Hansen 
would put them off with some statement that he was 
doing his best to keep things going. Mr. Young testified 
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that in August, 1945 he talked to Nephi J. Hansen about 
making a trade of some of his stock and Mr. Hansen:did 
not say anything to him about the sale of the Sugarhouse 
property to his son, which had already been consum-
In~ted, and in 1946 he and Mr. Bates called on Hansen 
and asked him about revenues and he made no r~ply 
except to state that his salary would eat everything up 
and on that occasion nothing was said about the sale of 
the Sugar house property; that he first learned about the 
sale of the property a little over a year before the trial; 
and that at no time did he ever receive any information 
by way of letters, reports or anything with respect to 
this company. Mr. Cutler testified that when he first 
became a stockholder he got sonie dividends but none 
had been paid for a long, long time; that he never re-
ceived any notice of stockholders meetings; that he was 
well acquainted with Nephi J. Hansen; at one time 
Nephi J. Hansen told him he was operating the property 
under the direction of the mortgagee (R. 297) and upon 
one occasion when he asked Nephi J. Hansen about the 
property, although Hansen evaded, he did say, "if there 
is anything left out of this company I am going to see 
that my family gets it" (R. 298) and used cuss words 
to emphasize his statement. Upon another occasion 
Nephi J. Hansen advised Cutler that once in a while 
they held a stockholders meeting when they had some · 
business and when occasion arose he would let Cutler 
know (R. 300). Cutler knew nothing about the officers 
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of the cmnpany except that Nephi J. Hansen was run-
ning it. 
Clyde Hansen, a son of Nephi J. Hansen and sf4cre-
tary of the company. testified that his father always had 
managed the company (R. 209) and William Hansen 
stated that as far as he was concerned his father was 
the entire company (R. 412). 
In 1945 the Granite Holding Company owned but 
one remaining piece of property (R. 311) (R. 430). This 
is situated at the corner of 21st South and Highland 
Drive in Salt Lake City, with a frontage on 21st South 
in excess of 80 feet and on Highland Drive of 207.5 feet. 
It is business property. On the ground floor were lo-
cated many store rooms and upstairs were 24 ·to 26 
apartments (R. 185, 186, 187). On July 18, 1945 this 
property was mortgaged to the Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company, and on July 18, 1945 the balance due on the 
mortgage was $74,500.00 (R. 265). In 1941 this mort-
gage "·as $82,528.13 (R. 267). In July of 1945 there 
had been $1961.76 paid by mortgagor, the corporate. 
defendant, for 1945 taxes. Interest payments had all 
been made, and on June 2, 1945 the interest was paid 
up to July 1, 1945, and on July 26, 1945 was paid to 
August, 1945. The mortgage originally had been for a 
sum of $150,000.00, but that mortgage included other 
property which was sold off from time to time (R. 217). 
At the time of the trial in June of 1948 the balance due 
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on the mortgage was $61,500.00 and there was a credit 
balance of $2158.32 to pay taxes. 
This property was income producing at the time of, 
the sale. Mr. William L. Hansen purchased the property, 
investigated it and made up a statement with the help 
of his father ( R. 78) which showed gross income of 
$13,590.00 in the year 1943, $17,501.00 in the year 1944, 
and for the first four months of 1945 of $7,932.00 (Ex-
hibits 2, 3 and 4). There was evidence by , an excep-
tionally well qualified expert (witness Keipe) (R. 218) 
that the fair value of the property at the time of the 
sale, that is, July 16, 1945, was $115,000.00 and this 
value was arrived at by averaging the cost of replace-
ment new, less depreciation, capitalized earnings value, 
and by physically viewing the, premises and appraising 
it. 
In the spring of 1945 the defendant William Han-
sen had a conversation with the members of his family, 
including his brothers, about getting some portion of 
property in which his father was interested for "the 
rest of the family". This conversation took place at his 
house, and those present were his sister Mary (Mary 
Southwick), LaRue, Lew (Lewis F. Hansen), father 
(Nephi J. Hansen) and the witness. Thereafter his 
brother Lewis went down and checked on the Sugar-
house property and Lewis came back and stated that 
he wanted his portion out of other property (R. 307) 
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and Willian1 Hansen stated he was interested in getting 
his portion out of other property, that is, property other 
than the Sugarhouse property, that he never did get 
anything out of the other property and he then talked 
to his father about obtaining the property in Sugar-
house (R. 307) and that it ·was suggested by his father 
that he do something about buying· it. He also testified 
(R. 398) his mother first approached him and asked him 
if he couldn't do something about the Sugar house prop-
erty. There was testimony William made some cursory 
examination (R. 400) and finally took a deed to the 
property involved in this suit (Exhibit E) which was 
dated and acknowledged July 16, 1945 and recorded July 
28, 1945. 
\Yilliam Hansen also testifed that the .. only one he 
ever knew to have anything to do with the Granite Hold-
ing Company was his father (R. 409), that the property 
- in Sugarhouse had been the main source of livelihood of 
- his father and mother for many years; that his father 
was getting to be an old man, 77 at about the time of the 
sale (R. 410) ; that when he stated he talked to the Com-
pany about the sale that he really meant that he talked 
to his father ( R. 412). 
Lewis F. Hansen, a brother of William Hansen and 
one of the original plaintiffs, stated that he was present 
at a conversation on July 14th before the deed to Wil-
liam Hansen was acknowledged (R. 334), at which his 
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two sisters, his brother Clyde, his mother and father, 
and his brother William were present, at which time the 
matter of the proposed sale of the Sugarhouse property 
was under discussion and at which meeting Lewis F. 
Hansen stated in substance that he thought something 
should be done about the stockholders before the sale 
was made, and his brother William replied that it was 
none of the business of Lewis F. Hansen about the stock-
holders, their father (Nephi J. Hansen) had control and 
their: father could do what he wanted. 
On July 16, 1945 a deed was executed and acknowl-
edged by the defendant Nephi J. Hansen, as president, 
and attested by Clyde Hansen, as secretary of the cor-
poration, by which all the property involved in this law 
suit was granted to William L. Hansen. Two days there-
after, according to the record, a resolution was enacted 
by the Board of Directors of the Granite Holding Com-
pany authorizing and directing Nephi J. Hansen to exe-
cute and deliver a deed to the property upon payment of 
not less than $10,000.00 over and above the amount of 
the mortgage. The minutes are Exhibit D. Nowhere in 
these minutes is the name of the purchaser of this prop-
erty mentioned. The witness Clyde Hansen, secretary 
of the corporation, testified this was not done to cover 
up and that at the time the mmutes were written up he 
was not sure his brother William was to be the pur-
chaser, but that everyone knew the property was to be 
sold to his brother William (R. 192-193). When con-
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fronted with the deed and his attention ealled to the 
fact the deed was dated and acknowledged two days 
before the minutes and the resolution, he statt>d he had 
no comment to make as to why \Yilliam 's nan1e was not 
shown as the purchaser of the property (R. 196); When 
it came to paying the money the records show that on 
July 27th William L. Hansen delivered a check for 
$5,000.00 n1ade payable to Granite Holding Company, 
which check was endorsed Granite Holding Company, 
and six months later another check for $3,780.24 was de-
livered and made payable to Granite Holding Com-
pany. which check was endorsed Granite Holding Com-
pany, N.J.H. and then Hansen Holding Company, N.J.H. 
(R. 194) Exhibit G. The first $5,000.00 went to Nephi 
J. Hansen on the claim that that much money was owing 
him for back salary, although Clyde Hansen testified 
that he was secretary, was present at the meeting of 
the Board of Directors on July 18th, that the company 
had no books or records and that the company had no 
one on the payroll (R. 189); that he made no investiga-
tion to determine if there was any back salary owing 
and just took his father's word for it (R. 196) ; ·that 
his father voted for the resolution. He stated that the 
company had a bank account at the First National Bank 
in Sugarhouse (R. 200) and yet on the face of the check 
there is nothing to show but that the check was merely 
cashed by Nephi J. Hansen. He stated at R. 427 that 
the Hansen Holding Company was one of his father'::; 
companies, that the check for $3,780.24 bears his father's 
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endorsement, the names on the check ''Granite Holding 
Company" and "Hansen Holding Company" both being 
in his father's handwriting; that the corporation owed 
no debts that he knew of (R. 428) and that he never 
asked his father why he put the final payment of money 
in the Hansen Holding Company's account, and that 
he did not know why the proceeds of the check went to 
the Hansen Holding Company instead of being dis-
tributed to stockholders. William Hansen, among other 
things, testified that he was interested in holding this 
property in the family and he wanted to hold it together 
so that they would have it for themselves (R. 325). 
Lewis F. Hansen, with respect to the same matter, 
testified that upon the occasion of the family meeting 
when the matter of the sale came up, William made 
the statement he wanted to save the property for the 
family, to which Lewis countered that "he thought 
something ought to be done for the stockholders", which 
portion of Lewis Hansen's testimony has already been 
referred to (R. 336). Lewis F. Hansen testified that 
his sister, Mrs. Southwick, in his presence stated to 
William Hansen that William had gotten the property 
under false pretenses and that William ought to do 
something for the folks, and William replied that it 
was none of their business and that if they did not 
leave him alone he was going to sell it. 
At the time of this sale the property was not listed 
with any real estate company nor were any attempts 
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13 
made to solicit any offers from any person other than 
"\Yilliam Hansen, at least as far as William Hansen 
knew nothing like that had been done (R. 411). William 
Hansen testified that he did .. talk to a i\lr. Sid Nielson, 
a Mr. Harding and former Governor l\iabey. There is 
some evidence that Nephi J. Hansen had Inade an attempt 
to borrow some additional money on the property ( R. 417). 
The testimony was that rents were up, that for the 
first time in years there was full occupancy, that tenants 
desired to renew their leases and were willing to pay 
additional rent, and the condition with respect to the 
property was improving (R. 352), and Exhibits 2, 3 
and 4 furnished by the defense showed that rental income 
was on the up-grade until the time of the sale. 
There seems to be some mystery about when the 
meeting of the directors was held which ostensibly 
authorized and directed Nephi J. Hansen to execute and 
deliver a deed and what action was there taken. There 
is no question but at that meeting the vacancies in the 
Board were filled by putting two members of Nephi J. 
Hansen's family on the Board, one his daughter and 
one his ·wife, and Hoo1ler Knowlton, a real estate man 
in Sugarhouse, a long time friend of Nephi J. Hansen 
and for some time a tenant of Nephi J. Hansen (R. 181). 
Lewis F. Hansen testified he signed the minutes under 
protest some four months after July 18, 1945 at the 
office of counsel for appellant, and, as already stated, 
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his evidence was that at that meeting the only authori-
zation given to Nephi J. Hansen was to look into the 
possibility of a sale (R. 342). Mary Southwick, a 
daughter of Nephi J. Hansen, testified that she .had 
had no previous business experience, that she acted as 
a director at the request of her father (R. 261) and 
the first time she acted was upon the occasion when the 
resolution was made with respect to the sale of the 
property (R. 260). She said she never bought any stock 
and she does not know whether she ever saw Exhibit F, 
(the . certificate in her name) before or not; and that 
she was told that she was made a director and that she 
had a share of stock (R. 261). She testified her moth~r 
(Laura F. Hansen) was not at the meeting; (R. 262) 
that her father was getting along towards 80 years of 
age, that they were worried about him and that some-
thing had to be done to relieve him. The net results of 
the meeting of July 18, 1945 were these : A board of 
directors consisting of the following: 
Nephi J. Hansen 
Laura F. Hansen 
Clyde F. Hansen 
Lewis F. Hansen 
M·ary H. Southwick 
Hooper Knowlton 
Joseph E. Jensen 
Father 
Mother 
Brother 
Brother 
Sister 
Tenant and lifelong friend 
of Nephi J. Hansen . 
Dead at the time of the trial, 
about the same age as 
Nephi J. Hansen, a long 
time friend and acquaint-
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and an employee .of Nephi 
J. Hansen from the' time 
the business was started 
(R. 182) 
apparently proceeded to authorize the sale of corporate 
property to a son and brother of the officers of this 
corporation and a son and brother of the majority of 
the directors of this corporation when that sale had al-
ready been consummated without putting in the resolu-
tion the name of the purchaser, although it was well 
known, and authorized the President of the corporation, 
the father of the family, to convert $5,000.00 of the 
claimed purchase price to himself on a claim for back 
salary asserted by him to be owing and not hacked up 
by the books and records and not investigated by any 
officer of the company, and that six months later Nephi 
J. Hansen, the father, without any protest or question 
by any of the other officers or directors of the company 
approp.riated to himself the balance of approximatel-y: 
$3800.00 paid by his son. 
3. The Matter of Tender. 
Appellant raises the proposition that because the 
plaintiffs did not tender in court the amount of money 
paid by the defendant William L. Hansen, i.e., $8,780.24, 
that they have no standing whatsoever. 
In connection with . this proposition it should be 
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borne in mind that in the first place this is a derivative 
action by stockholders for the benefit of the corporation 
as well as a class action by the plaintiffs for themselve;; 
and all others similarly situated, and it should also be 
borne in mind that the plaintiffs got nothing whatsoever 
of the moneys paid by William L. Hansen and, under 
the facts, neither did the corporatio. The evidence was 
that this first $5,000.00 went to Nephi J. Hansen for 
alleged back salary, the authority thereof being voted 
by a Board of Directors consisting of himself, the imme-
diate members of his family and close personal friends, 
without any books and records or any investigation by 
the directors and officers including the Secretary and 
Treasurer as to the claim being valid, and the testimony 
by the Secretary that the company had no payrolls and 
owed no old bills ; and that the balance of the sale price 
was appropriated by the president of the corporation 
without any apparent authority whatsoever. It also 
should be borne in mind that the trial court (No. 7) 
found that moneys paid were converted by Nephi J. 
Hansen, the president of the corporation, to his own 
use and that the defendant William L. Hansen knew 
that the moneys were not used for corporate purposes. 
As a general proposition we agree that ordinarily in a 
suit to rescind a sale and recover property one going 
into a court of equity must do equity and make a tender, 
but this rule has many and varied exceptions. Many 
of the exceptions are stated in Williston on Contracts, 
Sections 1530 and 1531. Some of the exceptions are 
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where claiins are n1ade by plaintiffs that moneys are 
due and owing fron1 a person that has the property, 
where an accounting must be had between the partie.;;, 
where the court can take care of any moneys found due 
the defendant and the decree can thus protect the rights 
of the defendant, and where stockholders bring a sec-
ondary action for the benefit of a corporation, to say 
nothing of where, as in this case, the corporation on 
whose behalf the action was instituted gets nothing out 
of the proposed sale. 
\Yith respect to one of these propositions, we refer 
the court to an Arizona case decided in 1914, Frank lin 
v. Havalena Mining Company, 141 Pacific 727, where 
the court stated that in a complaint by stockholders seek-
ing to set aside a lease of the corporate property, the 
plaintiff need not offer to return any moneys to the de-
fendant which he had expended because that is a matter 
of defense and the court in making its decree will pro-
tect the rights of the defendant. 
We also refer the court to a case in Montana, Han-
rahan v. Anderson, et al, 90 Pacific 2d, 494, decided in 
1939. This was a secondary action by stockholders, and 
we quote a portion of the court's decision appearing at 
page 505. 
"We have saved until the last the questions 
as to plaintiff's right to relief, because they are 
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several and 'are based 11pon various fact situa-
tions. Defendants contend that, as plaintiff did 
not offer to restore everything of value rec~ived 
in the transactions attacked, his complaint failed 
to state a cause of action, and that defendants' 
objection to the introduction of any evidence 
should have been sustained. 
"It is well settled that in a stockholder's suit 
in behalf of the corporation, he need make no 
offer· to restore, for, not having himself received 
anything, there is nothing within his power to 
restore. Anderson v. Scandia Mining Syndicate, 
26 S.D. 558, 128 N.W. 1016; Edwards v. Mercan-
tile Trust Co., C.C., 124 F. 381; Stebbins v. Perry 
County, 167 Ill. 567, 47 N.E. 1048; McDermont 
v. Anaheim Union Water Co., 124 Cal. 112, 56 P. 
779; 6 Thompson on Corporations, 3d ed., sec. 
4578, and cases there cited. Obviously, it is not 
the stockholder, but the corporation, which must 
make whatever restoration, if any, the court may 
find equitable and upon which it may therefore 
predicate relief.'' 
And we call the court's attention to the fact that 
the Montana Supreme Court cites a North Dakota case, 
a Federal case, an Illinois case, a California case and 
Thompson on Corporations in support of the language 
above quoted. 
''Failure of minority stockholders, suing for 
the corporation to rescind an illegal sale of its 
stock, to offer to restore consideration received 
and retained by the company, is not fatal, since 
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the suit is in equity and the court Inay, by its 
'decree, do full jus tire between the parties.'' 
Michaels v. Pacifio Soft TYater Laundry (Cal.), 286 
Pacific 165, 1071. 
''Stockholders need not tender back consid-
eration which they do not have, and where there 
was no real consideration passed.'' 
Citizens Savings d!i Trust Co. v. Illinois Central 
Railroad, 182 Fed. 607, reversing 173 Fed. 556. 
4. The Matter of Fraud. 
Here is a corporation that Nephi J. Hansen op-
erated as if he were the sole owner and as if he had no 
duties to discharge except those he saw fit to impose 
upon himself, and without the slightest conception of 
the fiduciary relationship which he bore to the owners 
of this business. The records are complete with evi-
dence that no stockholder at any tim,e, exce:pt perhaps 
the immediate members of Nephi J. Hansen's family, 
knew anything about what was going on. Inquiries di-
rected to Nephi J. Hansen elicited nothing except eva-
sion and falsehood. There is no contradiction in the 
record with respect to the statements made by witnesse~ 
Young and Cutler as to the conversations with Nephi J. 
Hansen, and these statements alone show that Nephi tT. 
Hansen recognized no right in anybody to question his 
handling of the property. 
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erty as the property of Nephi J. Hansen and ultimately 
the property of the family. The very first talk about 
any sale of this property was brought up at a family 
conference. The matter was introduced by the mother 
according to the defendant William L. Hansen. In 1945 
the evidence is that the family, including the defendants 
Nephi J. Hansen and his son William Hansen, met and 
talked about dividing up their father's property, includ-
ing the property in question, and when William Hansen 
was unable to get anything out of other property at that 
time owned by Nephi J. Hansen he asked his father 
about obtaining the property in Sugarhouse, the prop-
erty involved in this action. Mary Southwick, a sister, 
testified in this case that her only concern with respect 
to this matter of business was to relieve her father, as 
he was getting along towards 80. No suggestion ap-
parently was ever made by anyone that the proper 
method was to call the stockholders together, elect a new 
and proper board of directors and appoint someone to 
manage the property who was efficient and capable of 
doing so. Instead, by common consent of the family, 
they decided that the son William should now step in, 
and son William's idea about it was very aptly ex-
pressed when he stated at the family conference that it 
was no business of the stockholders and that his father 
could do with the property as he saw fit. Clyde Hansen, 
one of the brothers, was secretary and treasurer of this 
corporation in name only. His testimony is a complete 
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refutation of any argument that he had any interest to 
serve except as to act as a figure-head and carry out 
his father's interests and the interests of the Hansen 
family. He knew nothing about any books, he said there 
never had been any books as long as he had been ·secre-
tary and treasurer, that he was not a bookkeeper, kne'v 
nothing about rental incomes, in fact, he knew nothing 
about anything affecting this corporation. Mary South-
wick was giYen a share of stock a few days before an 
important meeting of the board of directors a;nd sat 
down at that meeting according to her testimony and 
voted the alienation of all remaining property in this 
corporation without the slightest knowledge of what it 
was all about, without any conception of what her duties 
were and with no apparent desire to do anything except 
"relieve father". From all that appears from this rec-
ord it is perfectly plain that when the board of directors 
met each and all of them were either acting thro.ugh 
ignorance or through stupidity to do with the sole re-
maining assets of this corporation entirely in the in-
terests of the family of Nephi J. Hansen in the dividing 
up of his property. The testimony is that this corpora-
tion had been the main support of this family for many 
years, that Nephi J. Hansen had run it, not like a czar, 
but as if it was his private personal property, to do with 
as he saw fit and with accountability to no one. It had 
been a good thing, and in the hands of some person 
younger in age with some get-up-and-go in his system 
it could be made into ·a much better thing. It was too 
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good. a thing for the Hansen family to let out ·of its con-
trol by the untimely death or indisposition of Nephi ,f. 
Hansen. 
Nephi J. Hansen and his son sat down and made a 
deal about this property without any attempt to get any 
offers from any other person, without any attempt to 
ascertain what it would bring on the open market by 
offering it for sale or making known to the public gen-
erally that it was for sale, and at a time when the for-
tunes of the corporation were on the up-grade and the 
property itself was bringing in more and more revenue-3. 
There can be no argument about the latter state-
ment despite the fact that brother William disputes the 
statement made ·by Lewis F. Hansen that the investi-
gation made by Lewis F. Hansen produced the infor-
mation that the property was for the first time full)~ 
rented, that rents were being paid promptly, that tenants 
were anxious to renew their leases and were not adverse 
to increases in rents. Out of the mouth of William Han-
sen comes the information that rents were on the in-
crease, going from $13,000.00 in 1943 to $17,000.00 in 
1944 and in excess of $7,000.00 for the first four month8 
of 1945, or, if the trend toward increase did not continue 
through 1945, of at least $22,000.00 in 1945. Clyde Han-
sen testified that there were no bills owing as far as he 
knew, although as previously stated he kept no books 
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or records ~d did not know much about them~ To say 
this ~orporation was in such a ~ad shape that a s·ale 
had to be consumn1ated in order to protect the interest 
of the stockholders, particularly when the sale resulted 
in the stockholders absolutely getting nothing, under 
the facts and circumstances shown .in this case, is to 
deny common sense. There is not one bit of evidence 
that the mortgage holder was about to foreclose and, 
even if it had foreclosed, the stockholders could suffer 
no greater loss than they did by reason of the sale that 
was attempted to be consummated. This corporation 
had no other property and any deficiency which might 
have been rendered certainly would not have affected 
the stockholders, and under the evidence a foreclosure 
sale probably would have been had for more than the 
mortgage. On a foreclosure sale the company might 
lose everything, even granting that its financial condi-
tion was in the worst of shape, and by this sale the cor-
poration gained absolutely nothing. 
Add to all the foregoing that the price paid did 
not amount of $10,000.00 but only in round numbers 
$8700.00. The court after having heard the evidence 
found the fair and reaso1;1able value to be $100,000.00 
at the time of the sale. As previously stated, an excep-
tionally well qualified witness testified it was reasonably 
worth $115,000.00. .Add the fact that a so-called board 
of directors on the face of written minutes authorized 
a sale without putting in the name of the purchaser 
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when the name was already known and when in fact 
the deed had already been executed. Add Nephi .J. 
Hansen's reluctance, nay, studied refusal to inform any 
stockholder about the sale long after it had been con-
summated. Add the uncontradicted fact as shown by 
this record that the entire ,amount received went intQ 
the personal pocket of the president of this corporation, 
a portion on a claim for back salary about which there 
is not the slightest proof, and a portion by endorsement 
of a check which was finally deposited to his personal 
company. Add the fact that William L. H,ansen, despite 
his protestations, saw a copy of the resolution by which 
the board gave $5,000.00 to his father, and yet six months 
later he turned over an additional $3800.00 to his father, 
well knowing that his father had pocketed the previous 
$5,000.00, and ,a mere cursory examination of the last 
check a few days later would reveal that his father had 
pocketed the final rpayment. Add the fact that after 
William L. Hansen got hold of this property rents of 
$90,000.00 were collected in the next thirty-five months 
by William H,ansen. This is an average of in excess or 
$2570.00 ,a month or nearly $31,000.00 a year. The re-
sult makes it impossible to say this property was dis-
posed of by the officers of this corporation fairly, open-
ly, in good faith, and for the best interests of the stock-
holders of this corporation and in a manner free from 
fraud and over-reaching as against the stockholders. 
We quote from the language of this court in Noble 
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Mercantile Company v. Mt. Pleasant E. Co-op Inst., 42 
Pacific 869, 12 Utah 213: 
''They are chosen by the stockholders, and 
are entrusted ·with the exclnsiYe control of the 
property and the management of the corporate 
business. This creates a fiduciary relation be-
tween them and the stockholders, and the cor-
porate property becomes impressed with a trust, 
which must be administered for the exclusive 
benefit of the stockholders while the corporation 
is solvent, and for the benefit of the creditors 
when it becomes insolvent, and ceases to longer 
pursue the objects of its creation." 
We also quote from two other Utah cases, Victor 
Mining Company v. National Bank, et al, 15 Utah 391, 49 
Pacific 826: 
"The law will not permit an officer of a cor-
poration to act for the company and for himself 
in making any contract between them, or in any 
transaction to the subject matter of which they 
may have, or may thereby acquire, conflicting 
interests. In such case the agreement or assent 
of the officer will not bind the company. Officers 
of corporations are bound to exercise their offi-
cial powers in the utmost good faith for the 
benefit of their principals, in making or consent-
ing to any transaction, and the law will not allow 
them, as to the same transaction, to act for their 
own benefit. The agent cannot act for himself 
and his principal as to anything with respect to 
which their interests may vary. The reason is 
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that self-interest may prevent him from the per-
formance of the duties he owes his principal.'' 
Mcintyre v. The Ajax Mining Co. et al, 17 Utah 213, 
53 Pacific 1124 : 
''This is a controversy over the affairs of a 
corporation, in which the acts of the directors 
are involved, and the rights of the stockholders 
are to be determined. In such case the acts of 
directors, because of the fiduciary relations 
· existing between the officers and stockholders, 
will be closely scrutinized in equity, and the di-
rectors held to a strict measure of care, duty, 
fidelity, and disability. Honest and faithful ad-
ministration of corporate affairs, and fidelity of 
the trustee to the cestuis que trustent, are what 
the law aims at; and directors of a corporation 
will not be permitted to gain a pecuniary ad-
vantage over the stockholders because of their 
official positions, and consequent superior knowl-
edge of the affairs of the company. 'That a 
director of a joint stock corporation occupies one 
of those fiduciary relations where his dealings 
with the subject matter of his trust or agency, 
and with the beneficiary or party whose interest 
is confided to his care, is viewed with jealousy by 
the courts, and may be set aside on slight grounds, 
is a doctrine founded on the soundest morality, 
and which has received the clearest recognition 
in this court and in others.' Oil Co. v. Marbury, 
91 U. S. 587; Peabody v. Flint, 6 Allen 52; People 
v. Township Board of Overyssel, 11 Mich. 222.'' 
In Ryan v. Old Veteran Mining Company, et al, 
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(Idaho 1923), 218 Pacific 381, the Supre1ne Court of 
Idaho had this to s~y : 
''Directors of corporations act in a fiduciary 
capacity. They hold the corporate property in 
trust. and any attempt on their part to divest 
the use of such property to their personal profit 
or interest, is a violation of the trust imposed by 
Yirtue of the office.'' 
Fairness and good faith are essential on the part 
of those acting under statutory authority in the sale of 
all of the corporate assets over the protest of minority 
stockholders. Ervin v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 27 Fed-
eral 625: 
"The right of the specified n1ajority to sell 
all the assets is absolute in so far as the fact of 
sale,- and whether one should be made, is con-
cerned. Upon the question of terms and condi-
tions, however, the expediency thereof and 
whether they are for the best interests of the 
corporation must be honestly and in good faith 
considered. While it is the right of the majority 
to pra~tically desert the corporate venture by 
selling out its assets, and thereby, in the case of 
a highly profitable concern, deprive their asso-
ciates of the opportunity to reap gains in the fu-
ture by continuing in business, yet . this right 
cannot be exercised except upon terms and con-
ditions that are fair to the corporation. The price 
to be paid, the manner of payment, the terms of 
credit, if any, and such like questions, must all 
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meet the test of the corporation's best interest." 
Allied Chemical ,dl; Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 
(Delaware) 120 Atlantic 486. 
The question of price, where a minority stockholder 
Is objecting to a sale of the corporate assets, is not 
purely a business matter, but the court must, in order 
to determine good faith, consider the fairness of the 
price paid. 
Re American Telegraph & Cable Co., 248 N. Y. 
Supp. 98. 
This court, in Beggs v. Myton Canal <f; Irrigation 
Co., 179 Pacific 984, 54 Utah 120, had before it a contract 
made by a corporation for the disposal of all its assets. 
The court says : 
''In the case at bar neither bad faith nor de-
ceit were proved by the plaintiffs. The evidence 
affirmatively shows good faith and honesty and 
probably good judgment by the directors of the 
company in making the Taylor contr~act, as also 
by the majority of the stockholders in ratifying 
the same. Apparently there was nothing for them 
to do save to dispose of the company's canal and 
ditch rights to the best possible advantage. The 
company was devoid of funds ; its treasury stock 
was uns~alable; unless it could convince state and 
federal officials that it had the financial ability 
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to proceed with its project, it eould obtain no 
extPnsion of time in which to continue and com-
plete its plans and work. It could not furnish the 
required proof of financial strength; to save its 
water filings and other rights it ·was necessary 
to obtain financial assistance; the loss of the en-
tire property was imminent; the proposed con-
traet with Taylor offered hope and promise of 
saYing a substantial sum to the stockholders. Un-
der these circumstances it was not only within 
the po"~er of the directors and the majority stock-
holders, but it was their duty, to take some action· 
which in their judgment would avoid the threat-
ened loss and wreckage.'' 
Compare the present case with Beggs v. Myton 
Canal & Irrigtaion Co .. Was the Granite Holding Com, 
pany about to lose all that it had? Did the proposed 
sale offer hope and promise of saving anything for the 
stockholders? In the Beggs case by reason of the con-
tract of sale the stockholders had an opportunity to get 
water through canals to be made available by the pur-
chaser. In the Beggs case by making the contract valu-
able water filings theretofore made could be proved up, 
title obtained and the water made available to its stock-
holders. Was any like situation present here by reason 
of the proposed sale to William Hansen~ Was the 
corporation in such a state that should the sale not be 
consummated the stockholders would be in a worse 
position than they would have been were the contract 
fully consummated? By the making of the contract and 
the transfer of the title the stockholders here lost 
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ey~rything of any value tl;tey had. As already pointed 
out, foreclosure did not mean anything to these stock-
holders. For whose benefit was .this contract made~ As 
pointed out in the Beggs case, was it made for the best 
possible advantag.e of the ~ompany or was it made for 
the best :possible advantage of Nephi J. Hansen, his 
family, and particularly his son William L. Hansen. 
Appellant in its brief ·makes short reference to 
Beggs v. Myton Canal & Irrigation Co. From appellant'~ 
reference to this case one would think that the Beggs case 
involved rights of creditors. As a matter of f·act, in th~ 
Beggs case the plaintiff was a minority stockholder and 
the rights of creditors were not involved at all. Aside 
from this proposition it is inconceivable to us that 
creditors would have any greater right in the corporate 
property than stockholders. If the. corporation cannot 
dispose of its property so as to result in a fraud on 
creditors, it seems to us that it cannot dispose of its 
property so it will result in a fraud upon the stock-
holders. We recognize of course in the case of an in-
solvent corporation creditors must first be paid before 
stockholders participate in any of the remaining assets, 
but that is a question of priority and not a question of 
selling corporate property in a fraudulent fashion so 
as to cheat either creditors or stockholders. 
'rhere are many cases that any trans·action by a 
corporate officer with the corporation by which he se-
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cures corporate property are presumptively fraudulent 
and eventhough the price, ter1ns of sale ·and everythl'ng 
else is fair, they are subjeet to rancellation at the re-
quest of the corporation. 
There are many cases that transfers of corporate 
property to a wife of a corporate officer are in the same 
category, and in view of the family set-up here and this 
entire transaction there existed here as close a cohesion 
between these sons and daughters and this father as 
ordinarily exists between husband and wife, and under 
the circumstances we can see no good reason why in 
this case this court should not view the question here 
presented in the same fashion. But even the adoption 
of such a rule is not necessary for this court to ·affirm 
this judgment. Ample evidence is here present to sus-
tain a finding that there was a fraud perpetrated by 
father, son and family upon this corporation and conse-
quently upon the stockholders . 
.Appellant has much to say about the matter of price. 
Let there be no misunderstanding, we freely confess 
that some inadequacy of price is alone not enough to 
avoid a. sale. To paraphrase some of the cases, inade-
quacy of price is not fraud, but certainly it is evidence 
of fraud. We do not rely upon the inadequacy of this 
price alone and we venture to say that had that been 
the only proof this appeal would not be taken. But 
coupled with all the other facts and circumstances in 
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this case, what is the answer~ Was the contract openly 
and fairly arrived at~ Did the officers of this corpora-
tion act for the best interest of the corporation and the 
stockholders~ Did they perform the duties laid upon 
them by the law~ Did William L. Hansen in dealing 
with the officers and agents of this corporation act 
frankly, openly and in good faith, or did he assist, ad-
vise and connive with his father and his brothers and 
sisters to fraudulently obtain corporate property in 
violation of all the ordinary concepts of decency and 
fair dealing~ 
With respect to William L. Hansen's participation, 
we present the following cases : 
Old Mortgage & Finance Company v. Pasadena 
Land Company, 216 N.W. 925, Michigan 1928: 
'' 'If 'a third person joined with a corporate 
officer in dealing with the corporation, with 
knowledge that he is such officer, the contract 
may be set aside as to him as well as the corpor-
ate officer. This is upon the theory that, where 
a stranger participates with the officer of a cor-
poration in the commission of an act of manifest 
bad faith or breach of duty to it, he, equally, with 
the officer, commits a wrong, and ought not to 
derive profit from it.' '' 
We quote from Cahall v. Lofland, (Delaware 1921), 
114 Atlantic 224 at 237: 
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• 
'• One who partieipate~ with a tru~tee i11 the 
breach of trust Inav be held liable in a court of 
equity. If he still liolds the tru~t propert)' or its 
proceeds. he may be held as constructiYP trustee 
thereof: if he no longer holds the trust property, 
or its proceeds, he may be held liable in equity 
to account for the advantage deriYP<-L '' 
Fletcher, Corporations, Revised 1943, Vol. 13, page 
189 states: 
"Even if circumstances are such as to war-
rant a transfer of all assets or all corporate prop-
erty by a majority of stockholders or by the board 
of directors, the transfer may be in fact fraudu-
lent, oppressive or unfair to minority stockhold-
ers so as to warrant relief in their favor as rep-
resentatives of the corporation, on the ground of 
a breach of trust, regardless of whether the prop-
erty is transferred to the majority stockholders 
or managing officers themselves, * * * or to a 
third p1erson. And the breach of trust may consist 
in gains or advantages secured by the majority 
at the expense of the minority, or the exclusion 
of the minority from a fair participation in the 
fruits of the sale, or the grossly inadequate price 
paid for the property. (Italics ours.) 
''In selling all of the assets, majority stock-
holders must exercise the highest degree of good 
faith toward minority stockholders. N ave-M c-
Cord Mercantile Co. vs. Ranney, 29 Fed. 2nd 383; 
Hayden v. Official Hotel Red Book and Directory 
Co., 42 Fed. 875; Cardiff v. Johnson, 126 Wash. 
454. 218 Pac. 269." 
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The appellant argues that these plaintiffs have no 
right of action· against William L. Hansen to set aside 
the deed. Let it be remembered this is a secondary or 
deriyative action for the benefit of themselves and others 
siniilarly situated. 
The appellant ~also argues that the majority of the 
stockholders could meet and satisfy this transaction and 
thus prevent the recapture of the property in an action 
of this sort.:.., In his amended answer the appellant 
pleads· such a meeting, but no proof was offered to 
support it and it was abandoned, probably because 
appellant. himself had no faith in the claim. It seems· 
foolish to ma]{e any reply to such an argument. The 
above citations answer it. But to put it more plainly, 
how can the many· defraud the few. any more effectively 
than a few defraud the many~ Can four partners de-
fraud their three associates when three cannot defraud 
the four~ If the answer 'is in the affirmative, then a 
large corporation could defraud an individual when in 
a like case the individual would have to make restitution 
to the corporation. It seems to us the ·answers are so 
patent to require no further comment. 
5~ The Accounting. 
· (a) William L. Hansen is a Constructive Trustee. 
''Where the owner of property transfers it, 
being induced by fraud, duress or undue influ-
ence of the transferee, the transferee holds the 
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property upon a constructive trust for the trans,.. 
feror." · 
Restatement of the Law, Restitution, Section 166. 
''A constructive trust, or, as it frequently is 
called, a trust ex nmleficio, ex delicto, a trust de 
son tort, or an involuntary or implied trust is a 
trust by operation of law which arises contrary 
to intention and in invitum, against one who, by 
fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse 
of confidence, by commission of wrong, Qr by any 
form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, conceal-
ment, or questionable means, or who in any way 
against equity and good conscience, either has 
obtained or holds the legal right to property 
which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, 
hold and enjoy. It is raised by equity to satisfy 
the demands of justice. '' 
54 .American Jurisprudence, page 167, Trusts, sec-
tion 218. 
''Where one procures the legal title to prop-
erty from another by fraud or misrepresentation 
or concealment, or where one makes use of some 
influential or confidential relation which he holds 
toward the owner of the legal title to obtain such 
legal title from him upon more advantageous 
terms than he could otherwise have obtained, 
equity will convert such a one thus obtaining 
property into a trustee of a 'constructive trust.' '' 
Lawley et al v. Hicloenlooper et -al, (Utah 1923) 61 
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Utah 298, 212 Pacific 526. See also Chadwick v. Arnold 
et al, (Utah 1908) 34 Utah 48, 95 Pacific 527. 
''A constructive trust, or as frequently called 
an involuntary trust, is a fiction of equity, devised 
to the end that the equitable remedies available 
against a conventional fiduciary may be available 
under the same name and processes against one 
who through fraud or mistake or by any means 
ex maleficio acquires the property of another.'' 
Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm et al, (Utah 
1930), 290 Pacific 161, 76 Utah 372, at page 389 of Utah 
r~port. 
(b) William L. Hansen, Being a Constructive Trustee, is 
Under the Duty of Making Restitution and An Accounting. 
''A person who has tortiously acquired or re-
tained a title to land, chattels or choses in action 
is under a duty of restitution to the person en-
titled thereto.'' 
Restatement of the Law, Restitution, section 130. 
"(1) A person under a duty to another to 
make restitution of property received by him or 
of its value is under a duty 
'' (a) to account for· the direct product of 
the subject matter received while in his pos-
session, and 
'' (b) to pay such additional amount as com-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
,. 
37 
pensation for the U8P of the subject Inatter as 
will be just to both partie~ in YiPw of the fault, 
if any, of either or both of them. 
"(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) is ap-
plicable to an action brought solely to recover 
the income or Yalne of the use of the subject 
matter, or interest upon the amount of its value." 
Restatement of the Law, Restitution, section 157. 
"It is a strict duty of a trustee to keep and 
render a full and accurate record and accounting 
of his trusteeship to the cestui que trust, and the 
duty is strictly enforced by the courts. It is com-
monly governed by statutory provisions. Such 
duty of the trustee is not affected by the fact that 
he voluntarily assumed the trust. A trustee by 
operation of law-constructive or resulting-must 
account for and is chargeable with, subject to 
proper credits, property subjecurto the trust.'' 
54 American Jurisprudence, page 396, Trusts, Sec-
tion 497. 
''It is a general principle that one who. ac-
quires land by fraud, misrepresentation, imposi-
tion, or under any other such circumstances as to 
render it inequitable for him to retain the prop-
erty, is in equity to be regarded as a trustee ex 
maleficio thereof for a person who suffers by 
reason of the fraud or other wrong (citing cases). 
It is elementary that one who holds property in 
trust for another may be required to render an 
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accounting of the rents and profits. of property 
so held.''' 
Deaorso v. Thontas, et al., (Utah 1935), -89 Utah 
160, 50 Pacific (2) 951. 
(c) William L. Hansen, Being a Constructive Trustee and 
Having a Duty to· Account, is Chargeable With the Income 
From This Property, i.e., the Rents Received. 
We have already called the Court's attention to 
section 157 of Resta·t·ement of Law, Restitution (see 
ante, page 37). We wish to call the Court's attention to 
comment d Land under that section and illustrations 3 
and 4. We quote: 
"d. Land. If the recipient obtained land by 
fraud, duress, or other consciously tortious means, 
the claimant is entitled, at his election, to receive 
its incom~ or the reasonable value of its use . 
. . ..,, 
''Illustrations : 
'' 3. A transfers Blackacre to B, being induc-
ed to do this by B 's fraudulent representation 
that A owes B $10,000. B takes 'possession of 
Blackacre and rents it for $1000 for a year. At 
the end of the year, discovering the fraud, A 
brings a bill in equity to rescind the transaction 
and to obtain the land. A is entitled to retain 
the title to Blackacre and at his election to re-
ceive from B $1000 with interest from the time 
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of its receipt to the time of the decree or the 
reasonable rental value of the land (less expen-
ditures by B in accordance with the rule stated 
in Sec. 158). 
'' 4. Same facts as in Illustration 3, except 
that at the end of the year B sells the land for 
$12,000. A is entitled to receive from B $12,000 
or the reasonable value of the land, plus $1000 
or plus the reasonable rental value of the land 
for a year, plus interest on such amount to the 
time of the decree (less taxes and other expenses 
as stated in Sec. 158)." 
A Utah case is in point. This Court in the second 
appeal of Lawley v. Hickenlooper, already referred to, 
s·aid: 
"• * '*' There was testimony as to the reason-
able rental value of the several premises; also, 
there was testimony that much of the time the 
premises had not been rented, and that the sum 
of $250 was approximately the amount which had 
been received. Both counsel for plaintiffs and 
counsel for Sheya agree that Sheya held this 
property as a constructive trustee. 'The liability 
of implied, resulting, constructive or other trusts 
which do not impose any duty of renting the 
property on the trustees is confined to the rents 
which they actually receive or the benefit which 
they have enjoyed from using the property them-
selves.' 39 Cyc. 324. '' 
Lawley et ux v. Hickenlooper et al.., (Utah, 1924 ), 
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231 Pacific 821, 64 Utah 534, at 547. 
The test is not the reasonable rental value of the 
property where the taking is tortious. One taking in 
bad faith is in a much different position than one acting 
honestly. One acting in bad faith is entitled to and 
receives much less consideration than one acting in 
good faith. Both law and equity are repleat with illus-
trations of this situation. Compare Illustrations 3 and 
4 of Restatement, Restitution, cited above with Illustra-
tion 5. Compare Baker v. Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 
Pacific 117, where the taking and occupancy were in 
good faith, with Van W·agoner, v. Whitmore, et al, 58 
Utah 418, 199 P~acifi.c 670. In this latter case, an action 
in ejectment, defendant is ousted when his title fails; 
the plaintiff recovered the rental value as increased 
because of the defendant's improvements where the 
defendant failed to show color of title or good faith 
possession, and the defendant failed to recover anything 
by way of improvements. 
The evidence is that rents paid were $90,017.00 UiJ· 
to June 30, 1948 (R. 499). By exhibit 8 the defendant 
showed additional rental income to October 1, 1948, of 
$7,699.00. (Received in evidence at R. 606). These 
figures produce a total $97,686.00. There is no other 
evidence. No one was produced who testified as to 
reasonable rent~al value of these premises up to the 
latter date. Even if reasonable rental value was con-
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trolling, in the absence of evidence except as to the 
amount of rents received, it seems to us the only con-
clusion to be drawn is that the reasonable rental Yalue 
was the amount of rent received, i.e., $97,686.00. 
True, there was evidence rents were increased. This 
is business property and not subject to O.P.A. All rents 
were going up during this period. That is a matter of 
common knowledge. The very purpose of the Price 
Control Act was to prevent increases in rentals on hous-
ing property, but no controls were put upon commercial 
property. 
Appellant argues an increase in rents was brought 
about by reason of improvements placed on the prop-
erty by him, that rents were fixed by ~eason of the evi-
dence as to what they were during the first four months 
of 1945, •and then assumes the increase was brought 
about by improvements put there by him. There is no 
evidence of any kind as to the Vlalue of the improve-
ments, how much they enhanced the value of the prop-
erty or how much they increased the rents, except the 
stipulation at R. 515. The only evidence is as to how 
much the claimed improvements cost. 
Appellant also contends he is only accountable for 
the reasonable rental value of the premises and not for 
the •amount of rents received. But as previously stated 
the only evidence on the subject is the total of the rents 
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rec.eived. Van Wagoner v. Whitmot"te is to the effect that 
one occupying in bad faith must pay reasonabl.e .rental 
value with the improvements on, and the present case 
reasonable rental value and rents re.cejved 1are synono., 
mous. 
There is some authority for the proposition that a 
bad faith occupier is entitled to credit for the increase 
in the rent produced by the improvements. See section 
28 of 31 Corpus Juris, Improvements, page 320. But he 
is not entitled to credit for increased rents and improve-
ments. We show hereafter this appellant is not en-
titled to credit for improvements, and the case was tried 
on the theory that perhaps he should be allowed the 
increase in the rents, and that is the reason for the 
stipulation sho·wn at R. 515. 
Actually, Utah law is not in accordance with the 
statement in Corpus Juris above referred to, and is much 
harsher on 1a defendant in the position of William L. 
Hansen. Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, supra. 
However, appellant has no just complaint on this 
item, because the trial 'court actually allowed a credit 
of $4,240.87, the amount of the agreed increased rents~ 
as will hereafter be shown. 
(d) Credits to be Allowed William L. Hansen. 
We concede that William L. Hansen is entitled to 
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credit for the following items, but ·those items alonP, 
i.e.: Payments of principal ·and interest on the mort-
gage; taxes paid, reasonable and necessary cost of 
operation; reasonable cost of necessary repairs. We 
refer to Section 158 of Restatement of the Law, Restit'l:.-
tion, which reads: 
''A person is entitled to specific restitution 
of property from another or to the product of 
such property only on condition that he compen-
sate the other for e~enditures with reference to 
the subject matter which have inured to his bene-
fit, to the extent that justice between the parties 
requires.'' 
We also Ciall the Court's attention to the comments 
commencing at page 630. The comment is to the effect 
that one who takes property wrongfully is not entitled 
to recover the cost of the repairs but only the amount 
by which the repairs increased the value of the property; 
but at the trial we conceded that the cost of repairs was 
a proper credit and we still concede it except as to re-
pairs shown on Exhibit 8. At the trial we ~also conceded 
\rarious specific items, and we do not wish to be under-
stood ·as attempting to withdraw those concessions, al-
though the classification of the expenditure made by 
Hansen In many of those instances was not clearly 
shown. 
Operation Costs. 
As before stated, we concede these should be al-
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lowed, and they were allowed. Light, heat and water, 
hauling garbage, one-half total telephone expense (more 
than the monthly charge), damages paid to tenants all 
on exhibit 7, and the monthly telephone charge, heat, 
lights, water, and trash disposal expense on exhibit 8 
were allowed. But by making that concession we do not 
wish to be understood as consenting to any allowance 
by way of salary and taxes thereon paid to Nephi J. 
H·ansen or any allowance to WilHam L. Hansen on his 
claim for services. Such items were disallowed. 
Now, in the first place these two men collaborated 
together to defraud this corporation of the property. 
In addition the evidence is that Nephi Hansen did 
nothing at the office; he certainly kept no books and 
rendered no service o~ any value; nor was there ·any 
proof that his services were at all necessary for the 
preservation of this property. It would be strange in-
deed if two thieves were allowed salaries for looking 
after stolen property, and these two men are exactly 
in that position. The· trial court, as we understand it, 
based his disallowance of these two items on that propo.:. 
sition. 
At one time trustees with active duties under an 
express trust were not entitled to compensation unless 
the trustor so declared in his deed or instrument of 
trust. This has been changed, and he is now generally 
allowed reasonable compensation based upon the value 
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of his services to the trust, or to the beneficiary. We 
have made a diligent search and have been unable 1o 
find any case which hold8 that a constructive trustee is 
entitled to compensation, and we venture the opiniou 
that the reason for the lack of such cases is that no ~ueh. 
trustee ever yet has had the temerity to ask for it. ''Thus 
if the recipient was tortious, he should b~ar any losses 
resulting from the transaction and should not benefit 
from profits.'' Pages 630 and 631, Restatement, Resti-
tution. If a trustee gambles with trust funds, the losses 
are on him, and if a profit is realized the tr-ust estate 
gets the profit, and no court would allow him anything 
for his misuse of trust property. To do otherwise would 
put a premium on improper and illegal actions of a 
trustee. Now, this trustee and his father combined and 
conspired together to defraud this corporation of its 
property, and to say that they should have compensa-
tion for looking after it during the time they kept it 
away from the corporation would put a premium on dis-
honesty; for the net result would be that two in their 
position could very well say, ''if we do not succeed in 
our dishonesty, at least we will not lose as a court will 
compensate us for our services and we will be out 
nothing." Neither the law nor equity aids a wrongdoer, 
and these two men were wrongdoers. 
There is plenty of law that a trustee who is right 
to start with and then go~s wrong can be and should be 
denied compensation. We quote from 54 American 
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Jurisprudence 423, section_ 538 of Trusts, as follows: 
~·. ! .. : . \t. f:'': . 
"The general rule is that a trustee who re-
pudiates the trust or violates or neglects his d~ty 
is not entitled to compensation or commissions. 
Certainly, the court, in its discretion, may in such 
case deny or reduce compensation, although no 
such power is given to it by statute. 
. "Wilfulness and bad faith in misconduct are 
grounds for completely depriving a trustee of 
compensation, and recklessness or gross negli-
gence, without intentional violation of duties, ef-
fecting serious loss to the estate, justifies a 
court's denial of compensation to a trustee; to 
allow compensation under such circumstances. 
would be to put a premium on recklessness and 
negligence.'' 
We quote from a headnote of a Colorado case, Pol-
lard v. Lathrope, 20 Pacific 251, 12 Colorado 171: 
''Where one in the possession of property, 
and sought to be charged as trustee, denies the 
trust, claiming title as absolute owner, he can-
not, on judgment being rendered against him, 
claim any compensation for services in the man-
agement of the property.'' 
And from an Oklahoma case, Roywr v. Dobbins, 239 
Pacific 157, 111 Oklahoma 156: 
''Trustee, who has denied trust and claims 
trust property as his own, is not entitled to be 
reimbursed for expenses incurred in manage-
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ment of trust estate after such repudiation." 
And from an Oregon case, Royal v. Royal, 47 Pacific 
828, 30 Oregon 448 : 
''A trustee who occupies · the land, and re-
ceives the income therefrom, for which he renders 
no account, is not entitled to compensation for 
services.'' 
How can \Villiam L. Hansen claim and be allowed 
a credit for moneys paid to his father-a man who vio-
lated his trust to the corporate defendarrt-'-for doing 
nothing much particularly except now and then sitting 
around an office, answering the telephone and listening 
to an occasional complaint of a tenant. It appears more 
likely that William was paying his father a quid pro quo 
for his making it so easy for William to get possession 
of this property. There is no proof whatsoever that the 
father did anything to benefit this corporation after 
William took possession of the property, and trust funds 
cannot be charged with payments without proof either 
of specific authorization or benefit. 
In his sound discretion the trial court denied 
credits for these two items; there is no proof of abuse 
of that discretion; there is ample evidence to support 
his decision. This court should not upset his ruling in 
view of the record here. 
Improvements. 
~· At the trial we contended strenuously and still con-
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tend that William L. Hansen under the circumstances 
of this case was not entitled to take any credit for any-
thing by way of improvements. As to credit for im-
provements we refer to Comment d, Improvements and 
additions of Restatement, page 632 Restitution." 
At law one who improved another's land could not 
recover anything for improvements. See Jensen et ux 
v. Probert et al, (Oregon, 1944), 148 Pacific (2) 248. The 
discussion starts at page 251. This applies to good 
':faith holders as well as others, but as the case points 
out equity "borrowing from the civil law, would under 
some circumstances soften the harsh rule of the common 
law by allowing compensation by an occupier who in 
good faith improves land. * * * '' 
Occupying claimants statutes were passed by many 
states to alleviate the harshness of the common law 
rule. Utah has such a statute. See sections 78-6-1 and 
104-57-4, Utah Code. But under this statute this court 
has held that one not possessing the property in good 
faith cannot recover the value of the improvements. 
Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Company, 47 Utah 238, 
152 Pacific 1180. 
In equity a bad faith claimant C'annot recover for 
improvements. 
''In all cases where an occupant is entitled 
to recover for improvements made to the prop-
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erty, the elen1ent of good faith and innocent mi8-
take is essential; ·for, if a person lays out money 
on another's property, with knowledge or notice 
of the true state of the title, he has no claim to 
be reimbursed for improvements.'' 
3 Pomeroy's Eq,uity Jurispnulence, Section 1241. 
''''/here the deed is void because of a wrong 
or fraud of the grantee, it does not constitute 
such color of title as to entitle him to compensa-
tion for his improvements.'' 
31 Corpus Juris 332, citing an Iowa case, Lindt v. 
Uihlein, 89 N.W. 214, an action to rescind and recover 
property. 
In Gaetke v. Ebarr, (~Iinnesota, 1935), 263 N.W. 
448, where misrepresentations which induc,ed the plain-
tiff to exchange property were fraudulent and false ~and 
where the plaintiff brought suit to rescind the contract, 
it was held that no recovery for improvements would be 
permitted the defendant since he held the property 
transferred to him in bad faith. 
In Peterson v. Weber County et al, (Utah, 1939), 
103 Pacific (2) 652, 99 Utah 281, an equitable action 
where there was ~an answer asking for affirmative relief 
for the value of improvements put upon the property, 
this court held the possession was in good faith and 
allowed recovery of the value of the improvements. In 
a separate opinion Wolfe, J., states the action partakes 
of a bill quia timet, discusses whether or not a separate 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
adion should have been maintained by, the defendant 
for the value. of the improvements, and says that it is 
jnhe~·ent in equity to enter a decree on condition of an 
allo;wance for the value of the improvements, and we 
think implies that whether the relief prayed by the occu-
pant is under the occupying claimants statute or in 
equity the basis of his recovery will be the same; i.e., 
whether or not he was ·and is a good faith occupier. 
It strikes us that this case at least acknowledges 
that whether in law under this statute or in equity, the 
rule is, before improvements can be allowed, the claim~ 
ant must be shown to have been a good faith holder of 
the title and to have made the improvements in good 
faith. A· bad faith claimant cannot recover for improve-
ments under this statute. Should he be any more 
favored in equity 1 
The trial court allowed defendant for each and 
every item of claimed improvements on the first page 
of Exhibit 7: elevator $2100.00, stairway $700.00, base-
ment $1440.00, a total of $4240.87, and $466.00 for archi-
tects' fees; and on the second page of Exhibit 7 all of 
the items, totaling $2252.45, of which all but $140.00 for 
office supplies, are listed by way of improvements. We 
think these a1lowances were contrary to the law of this 
state on the basis of the authorities above cited, and 
that was our· position at the trial. Included in the 
amounts allowed was $4240.87, referred to previously 
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at page 42 of this brief, and it does not make any dif-
ference whether the allowance was made by way of in-
creased rents or by way of improven1ents. Certainly 
appellant is not entitled to haYe a double allo,vance 
made for that sum. 
Other Disallowances. 
Other items disallowed on Exhibit 7 were a con-
tribution of $500.00 to the Sugarhouse Chamber of 
Commerce Centennial Program; $600.00 claimed to have 
been spent at the .Ambassador Athletic Club in wining 
and dining various persons ; $208.01 telephone tolls; 
$443.96 claimed interest on loan made by defendant Wil-
liam L. Hansen; attorney's fees of $1117.50, and $35.70 
for flowers. There is no proof of any kind that this cor-
poration benefited by any of these expenditures or that 
they were at all necessary to protect this property. The 
fact of the matter is they are strictly personal expendi-
tures made by the appellant. We do not think much 
further comment is necessary with respect to the dis-
allowances of these i terns. 
William L. Hansen was taking out of this property 
a great deal more money than he was putting into it, 
and even if he did borrow some money from the Davis 
County Bank, if he had not been so free in his expendi-
tures, as the accounting shows during the period cov-
ered by Exhibit 7 he is $24,788.96 short in his accounts, 
he would have had ample moneys to use for proper pur-
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poses and no necessity would have existed to borrow 
money. As to attorney's fees, it is perfectly apparent 
frmn the evidence that those fees were in part for work 
done on this case by appellant's attorney and as to any 
other items, there was no benefit to the corporation. As 
to the i tern of telephone bills disallowed, by agreement 
$287.61 as shown on the first page of Exhibit 7 was al-
lowed. The evidence was that the monthly rate on the 
telephone was $11.93 per month so the allowance was 
of an average in excess of $12.00 per month, more than 
necessary to take care of the monthly telephone bill. 
The balance of the bill of $208.01 was for long distance 
calls and other items not shown to be chargeable to the 
property. 
The court also disallowed an item of $5609.15 
shown on the second page of Exhibit 7 as checks drawn 
to cash not otherwise included. With respect to this 
item and with respect to the accounting generally, it 
must be borne in mind that the duty to account was on 
the 'appellant. If he did not keep rproper books and r~­
ords so that the items could be classified it is too bad. 
It was his duty to keep clear and accurate accounts. 
From the way in which these accounts were kept one 
is led to -the conclusion that they were purposely 
jumbled up so that the situation never could be prop-
erly unwound. The type of records kept was one of the 
reasons that at the trial we agreed ·to pass many of the 
items contained on the first page of Exhibit 7 without 
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proof, particularly the Inajor portion of the iten1s listed 
under repairs and improvements, as otherwise the 
hearing on the accounting would have been intermin-
able. It is doubtful that \Yilliam L. Hansen ever could 
justify any fair proportion of the $22,859.41 allm,·ed 
him therein. \Ye quote from 54 American Jurisprudence 
at page 398, section 499 of Trusts: 
"The refusal or failure of a trustee to account 
furnishes a good reason for adopting ,against him 
the most rigid rules of calculation, and if a trustee 
does not keep clear, distinct, and accurate ac-
counts, all intendments and presumptions are 
against him. The rule is applicable to refusal to 
account for rents and profits. Inadequacy of his 
accounts may result in his being made to pay costs 
of an accounting and the expenses of an account-
ant. Certainly, uncertainty in the accounts of a 
trustee, which is due to his own gross negligence, 
does not necessitate acceptance as verities, and 
the allowance, of his unverified and unexplained 
claims for fees and expenses.· Dereliction of the 
trustee in his accounting is a factor in charging 
him with interest or income.'' 
On Exhibit 8 the trial court disallowed $715.43 
labeled repairs as there was no proof that the same were 
necess·ary, and also because they were made subsequent 
to a finding by the court that this property belonged to 
the corporation, and ~after the court ordered a decree 
that the deed should be set aside. There is no justifi-
cation whatsoever in the evidence for the allowing of 
any such sum under the circumstances. 
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The same is true with respect to the item of $617.08 
office e~pe~s~. It is absolutely inc9nceivable that there 
wou~d be that sum of money spent during a three month 
period in operating an office where the only item of 
business was the collection of rents. 
Disallowance of a portion of the telephone bill was 
made and only that portion was allowed covering the 
monthly charge of $11.98 a month for the three months 
covered by that exhibit. 
The item of $600.00 for office salaries, the same 
having been paid to Nephi J. Hansen, was disallowed 
as were all the balance of the items shown on that ex-
hibit. These latter did not represent any expenditures 
of any kind, but ·were merely accruals in the accounts 
to take care of some prospective future expenditure 
and were items set up by the accountant. It will be 
time enough for a court to consider those expenditures 
when and if they are made. 
For the information of this court, we will state that 
the pencilled 'and pen and ink figures on Exhibit 7 were 
made by the trial court. On· the first page of Exhibit· 7 
the items disallowed were marked ''out'' and the ones 
allowed were marked '' o.k. '' On page two of the exhibit 
the items marked with an X were disallowed and the 
items marked with a check or a dash were allowed. The 
items allowed and dis 1allowed on Exhibit 8 are clearly 
stated to be either "allow" or "out". 
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Appellant contends that he 1s entitled to have al-
lowed to him a sum 'Of money, i.e., $8780.24 \vhirh lH~ 
paid in two installments, $5,000.00 at about the time the 
deed was delivered, and the balance of $3,780.:24 some 
six months later. There is no proof that the corporation 
ever got this money. In fact the proof is otherwise. 
The trial court specifically found that the money went 
to Nephi J. Hansen personally. The facts about the 
situation have already been referred to in this brief. 
We see no reason to re-argue our position but so there 
is no uncertainty about it we wish to state in view of 
the entire record it is perfectly apparent this money 
was known to go to the appellant's father to take care 
of him and there was no attempt by anybody, corporate 
officers or William L. Hansen, to do anything about it 
except to let the father appropriate it. In many ways 
that payment is in the same category 'as payments made 
by William L. Hansen to his father after he had ob-
tained the deed. We cannot see under the facts in the 
case how the trial court could give William L. Hansen 
credit for this sum,. The board of directors apparently 
authorized Nephi J. H'ansen to take the first $5,000.00, 
but in view .of the set-up on the board, that was the 
same as if Nephi J. Hansen authorized himself to take 
it. Nobody ever produced any evidence the money was 
owing, except the mere statement in the resolution; the 
secretary of the corporation on the stand knew nothing 
about any such debt; and in view of what happened to 
the subsequent P'ayment it seems clear William L. Han-
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getting some money to the father, knowing the same 
would go there and knowing the ·corporation would re-
ceive absolutely nothing. 
Appellant makes no attempt to analyze the ac-
counting features of this case. He generally levels a 
shot-gun blrast at all of it. Remarks of the Oklahoma 
court in Boyer v. Dobbins, already referred to, are per-
tinent here. We quote from page 156 of 239 Pacific: 
''We are simply invited to examine this long 
and complicated account and see whether we can 
discover some item or items which the court im-
properly disallowed. This we decline to do. If 
the defendant desired a review of the action of 
the trial court on. this branch of the case, he 
should have pointed out in his brief the errors 
complained of. Besides all of the expenses claim-
ed by the defendant were incurred after he had 
repudiated the trust relation, and it would not 
· have been error for the court to have disallowed 
the entire claim. Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567,. 
6 S. Ct. 870, 29 L. Ed. 940; Somerset Ry. v. Pierce, 
98 Me. 528, 57 A. 888; Hanna v. Clark, 204 Pa. 
145, 53 A. 757; Pollard v. Lathrop, 12 Colo. 171; 
20 p. 251." * * * 
6. Conclusion. 
Appellant makes many assertions in his brief, some 
of which we do not think require any comment. He states 
that Nephi J. Hansen was the only stockholder. There 
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is not one bit of proof as to how much stock Nephi J. 
Hansen or his family had or that he or they had any at 
the time of trial except ~Irs. Southwick. 'V e were g·oing 
to put Xephi J. Hansen on the stand (R. 258) but counsel, 
particularly itir. Rawlings, at a conference a.t the bench 
with the trial court, stated ~ ephi J. Hansen was in 
such a condition by reason of age and infir1nities he 
could remember nothing and knew nothing, and so we 
abandoned him as a witness. (See also R. 519). Much 
stock is outstanding in this corporation in the hands of 
persons other than the Hansens and three stockholders 
appeared, produced tpeir stock and were sworn and 
testified at the trial. Their rights and those of others 
similarlr situated is the issue in this case, not the rights 
of Nephi J. Hansen, even though he is a stockholder. 
The trial court from the bench made a staten1ent 
that the corporation was Nephi J. Hansen's alter ego, 
or something to that effect, and a finding of the same 
character was made. The sense of the statement and 
the finding is that Nephi J. Hansen so regarded it and 
had always treated it as being himself, and there is no 
need to make any statement to support such a proposi~ 
tion except to S'ay that his actions and the actions of his 
family as shown by this record is proof positive thereof. 
Appellant at one point in his brief makes the stato-
ment that when the ~urported sale was being handled 
the corporation was being represented by competent 
counsel, intimating it was Edward W. Clyde. The fact 
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of th~ matt.er is that Edward W. Clyde had nothing to 
~ with t~is t:ransaGtion and only appeared on the scene 
when the suit was filed, filing a d~murrer for the Gran .. 
ite Holding Company. 
Appellant in effect claims the trial judge prejudged 
the case, and appellant's counsel makes a personal issue 
out of it by referring to another case involving a trust 
relationship tried by the same judge which is now on 
appeal to this court. The fact is that as shown by the 
record the defendants and each of th~m had a full, fair, 
and complete opportunity to be heard, and on the ac-
counting the trial court was overly generous with the 
appellant, jf in nothing else, at least with respect to 
the improvement items, and a fair reading of the record 
will disclose that many of the items allowed were sup-
ported by flimsiest pretexts of proof. 
Three or four time in his brief appellant refers to 
the alleged refusal of one of plaintiffs' attorneys to 
answer as to "who hired him" and attempts to make 
son1ething out of that, presumably on the theory that 
it was counsel who drummed up the case. The fact is 
that when that particular bit of by-pl·ay took place both 
Mr. Jones and Mr. Jensen were making some attempted 
jocular remarks, and although the cold record does not 
reveal it, the refusal by Mr. Jensen was made in an 
at~empted humorous fashion· without ~any desire to "con-
ceal anything. It is perfectly plain that the trial court 
so sensed the matter because if he had wanted to know 
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who hired COUnsel it would haYe been an easy mattPl' 
for him to insist upon an ans\ver and the same wou1ll 
haYe been freely given. 
Appellant has much to say about the way plaintiffs 
came in and out of the case. This action was started lJ~· 
Lewis F. Hansen and his brother and by counsel other 
than the present counsel. Lewis F. Hansen quit on the 
e'ye of trial. It was a fortunate thing that other stock-
holders found out about the action having been brought 
and came in and had themselves made parties. It must 
be borne in mind that this corporation, in accordance 
with the testimony of the responsible officers, had abso-
lutely no books and records of any kind, and even if 
some stockholders had gone and made an inquiry to 
detPrmine who the stockholders were, it would have 
been without any result. It was well three stockholders 
were found by the people ultimately interested in this 
case who had stock certificates made out in their name:; 
and title to which certificates cannot be questioned. 
What difference does it make that the action was origi-
nally instituted by Lewis F. Hansen and apparently by 
his brother Clyde, and that they got out of the ca~{~ 
before it was tried; when ultimately the case went to 
judgment with three bona fide stockholders as parties 
plaintiff. This is particularly true in view of the fact 
that the action is a class action for the benefit of the 
stockholder plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 1 
In a case of this sort courts themselves hav.e .an in-
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terest, probably different from that in the ordinary case 
presented for decision, to see that justice is done and 
that the rights of stockholders are not frittered away. 
As indicative of that interest we call attention to the 
rules of civil procedure adopted and in force in the 
United States Courts. A portion of Rule 23 provides 
that an action of this kind shall not be dismissed with-
out approval of the court. It is perfectly apparent that 
'fhe reason for the rule is to ;prevent stockholders bring-
ing such an action where they represent themselves and 
others similarly situated from being bought off and 
settled with without the rights of all who are effected 
being protected. 
It would be strange indeed if the transaction here 
brought to light should be approved by any court. Mod-
ern legislation, and we have in mind among others the 
Securities Exchange Act, the Truth in Securities Act 
and the Holding Company Act, show an awakening de-
mand by the public that corporate officers and others, 
in their dealings with respect to corp·orate property and 
stockholders present and prospective, must be fair, 
frank open and above-board, and they must make full and 
complete disclosures with reS'pect to all of their trans-
actions. At one time, perhaps, the inner workings of a 
corporation and the fact that only a few might be hurt 
thereby were apparently not the concern of anyone par-
ticularly, but that is no longer the rule of this day. A 
corporate office today partakes of the nature of a public 
trust, and corporate officers and agents cannot deal 
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with corporate property as was done here: parcel it 
out to a member of the fmuily to the detriment of 
stockholders. 
The trial court in this case, like every trial court, 
had an opportunity to and did observe these witnessed. 
The evidence had to be secured from the mouths of 
the persons who were ''in on the deal''. Those persons' 
attitude on the witness stand, their interest in the out-
come of the case, their frankness and candor, or more 
aptly, the lack of them, all took place under his eye and 
in his hearing. There is no occasion to refer to any case 
or any authority on this proposition. In any case these 
are matters to be weighed in favor of supporting a 
judgment. 
The evidence, and the inferences to be drawn frorn 
it, are all in favor of the judgment being a proper one. 
That it should be affirmed is 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDGAR C. JENSEN 
JOHN H. SNOW 
ROBERT JOHN JENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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